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A model of team collaboration was developed that emphasizes cognitive aspects 
of the collaboration process and includes the major processes that underlie this 
type of communication: (1) individual knowledge building, (2) knowledge inter-
operability, (3) team shared understanding, and (4) developing team consensus. 
This paper describes research conducted to validate this model and determine how 
these processes contribute to team performance by analyzing two collaborative 
decisionmaking tasks. Team communications that transpired during two complex 
problem solving situations were analyzed and coded. Data was analyzed for two 
teams that conducted a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) and four teams 
that engaged in an air-warfare scenario. The MIO scenario involves a boarding 
team that boards a suspect ship to search for contraband cargo (e.g. explosives, 
machinery) and possible terrorist suspects. The air-warfare scenario involves 




Military forces are beginning to operate as a networked force, which allows them to plan, decide, 
and act collaboratively and concurrently to accomplish many tasks simultaneously. These 
collaborative capabilities are expected to contribute to reducing the time required to accomplish 
military objectives.  Rapid access to current, accurate, and relevant information, and the ability to 
engage in real-time collaboration with other decisionmakers who are geographically distributed, 
have become indispensable elements of the command and control (C2) planning and decision-
making process. While information access has always been critical to success in military 
operations, the processes embodied in recently emerging military concepts (e.g., rapid decisive 
operations) place an even greater emphasis on having rapid access to relevant and accurate 
information. These new military concepts derive their power from the effective linking or 
networking of the warfighting enterprise (Alberts, Gartska, and Stein, 2003).  This new way of 
conducting business is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to create a 
high level of shared awareness that can be exploited to achieve rapid decisive operations. 
 
While the U.S. has an unmatched ability to gather information on the environment, the 
adversary, and ourselves, we currently lack the collaborative planning capabilities (both mature 
systems and practiced operators) and C2 systems to use this information to enable decision 
superiority.  The ability to quickly create and leverage superior knowledge is a critical aspect of 
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effective military operations. This rapid formulation of knowledge and understanding of the 
battlespace should enable decision superiority, reduce operational risk, and increase the pace, 
coherence, and effectiveness of operations.  
 
The need for rapid access to current, relevant, and accurate information is at an all-time premium 
— especially for military operations. Moreover, the need for expeditious transformation of that 
information into “actionable” knowledge is increasingly recognized by the warfighter. This 
exchange and transformation of information to support the military decisionmaker is facilitated 
by a shared information environment, and the tools that enable collaboration.  New Information 
Technology (IT) Tools, used as part of a networked, web-based collaborative system for 
command and control are providing enhanced capabilities for improved decisionmaking.  These 
tools support planning and operational processes by providing an alternative means to 
communicate, collaborate, and share information among operators and decisionmakers than were 
provided in past operational environments. 
 
Concepts such as information and knowledge superiority, knowledge management, and effects-
based operations, are important enablers of effective military operations. The need to accomplish 
missions efficiently and effectively, with coordinated action, points to the demand for powerful, 
reliable, and capable IT tools to support the military decisionmaker. These tools are expected to 
be critical elements of success for the decisionmaker who will be operating in a constrained 
battlespace, working toward the goals of achieving shared awareness, information/ decision 




Inherent in many problem solving tasks is the need for extensive collaboration and coordination 
across functional areas and components within the organization to accomplish the mission.  
Collaboration tool suites are being introduced to facilitate these information-intensive 
interactions to support operational planning and decisionmaking processes by providing an 
alternative means to communicate, collaborate, and share information among warfighters that 
extends what is available in today’s current operational environments.  Enabled by high-speed 
bandwidth connectivity and electronic collaboration tools, it is anticipated that a collaborative 
information environment will facilitate the exchange of information among members of the Joint 
Force and those organizations supporting or being supported by the Joint Force.  The long-term 
goal for operating in a collaborative environment is to reduce planning timelines while 
increasing organizational effectiveness.  
The majority of military and business tasks today are performed by teams who collaborate to 
share information and task perspectives in order to reach a decision.  Benefits afforded by 
collaboration tools that are especially germane to the military include allowing smaller deployed 
warfighter footprints, and capitalizing on the synergy of the total command and control 
infrastructure. Collaborative tools offer the added capabilities of providing the ability to share 
information and resources, and coordinate among individuals across geographic and temporal 
boundaries. Collaboration is also essential to developing shared situational awareness among 
heterogeneous, distributed team members.  
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Collaboration offers great potential to better enable decisionmakers and operators to plan, 
monitor, execute, and assess activities across the spectrum of activities.  Capabilities afforded by 
collaboration tools include the ability to share applications, have a virtual workspace, use 
voice/audio/video, etc.  Many, if not all, of the benefits of participating in a face-to-face meeting 
can be gained using collaborative tools: Information flows quickly, outstanding issues are raised, 
and a certain amount of brainstorming can occur to arrive at a decision.  Additionally, all relevant 
users, or providers of information, reach a fuller understanding of the issues because they have 
seen other viewpoints and received a freer flow of information (Truver, 2001).  
From a military perspective, advantages of using a collaborative environment include: fewer 
personnel have to be located in the area of conflict; there are enhanced opportunities to share 
information among planners and decisionmakers; experts in remote locations can participate in all 
phases of the planning, decisionmaking, and assessment process; it will increase access to many 
additional sources of information that previously were not possible; it should reduce the time 
required for the planning, decisionmaking, and assessment process. 
 
Team collaboration and decision-making in complex, data-rich situations is being investigated to 
better understand the cognitive processes employed when teams collaborate to solve problems. 
This paper reports on research conducted under sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) Collaboration and Knowledge Interoperability (CKI) program. The research reported in 
this paper applies definitions of the cognitive processes included in the model to two different 
decisionmaking domains. Both involve team collaboration to solve complex problems. The 
Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) task involves a Coast Guard Operation to search a 
suspect ship for contraband material and suspect persons. The air warfare task involves a US 
Navy Aegis cruiser combat information center team identifying air tracks in a Persian Gulf 
scenario.  
 
Model of Team Collaboration  
 
A cognitive model of team collaboration emphasizing the human decisionmaking processes used 
during team collaboration was developed by Warner, Letsky, & Cohen (2004). This model 
applies to collaborative problem solving and includes the major processes that underlie 
collaborative team problem solving, as depicted in Figure 1. These processes include (1) 
individual knowledge building, (2) developing knowledge inter-operability, (3) team shared 
understanding, and (4) developing team consensus.  In this paper we describe research conducted 
to validate the model and determine how these processes contribute to team performance by 
analyzing two complex decisionmaking tasks.   
 
Many definitions of collaboration are found in the research literature, depending on the 
researchers discipline and perspective.  At the most fundamental level, collaboration refers to the 
joint effort of two or more agents to achieve a common goal (Nosek, 2003), where collaboration 
members construct judgments and then act on these judgments. A different definition of 
collaboration is “the mental aspects of joint problem solving for the purpose of achieving a 
shared understanding, making a decision, or creating a product.”  Yet another definition states 
that “collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain 
engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to act or decide on 
issues related to that domain” (Wood and Gray, 1991).  
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The types of problem-solving situations this model describes are ill-structured decisionmaking 
tasks, characterized by time pressure, dynamic information, with high information uncertainty, 
high cognitive workload (i.e., a large amount of knowledge is brought to bear to solve complex 
problems), and human-system interface complexity. The model focuses on three tasks; (1) team 
data processing, (2) developing a shared understanding among team members, and (3) team 
decisionmaking and course of action selection.   The model consists of general inputs (e.g., task 
description), collaborative stages that the team goes through during the problem solving task, the 
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Collaboration Stages & Cognitive Processes
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• individual task knowledge 
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• team task knowledge
development 
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• compare problem solution  
against goals
• team shared understanding
development
• convergence of individual 
mental models of solution
• analyze, revise output
Knowledge 
Construction
• individual task, team and domain
knowledge development
• individual knowledge object
development
• individual visualization and 
representation of meaning
Mechanisms for achieving Meta and Macro -Cognitive Processes (applies to all stages)
• Verbal communications: representing and discussing individual information, discussing team generated information,
questioning, agreeing / disagreeing, negotiating perspectives,,       discussing possible solutions, providing rationale.
• Non-Verbal communications: facial expressions, voice clues (vocal paralanguage), hand gestures, body movements(kinesics)
: 
 
Figure 1.  Model of Team Collaboration. (From Warner, Letsky, & Cowan, 2004). 
 
Team Types.  Team types described by the model include teams who operate asynchronously, 
whose members are distributed, and culturally diverse, where members possess heterogeneous 
knowledge, due to the unique roles played by each team member, and operate in a hierarchical 
organizational command structure, and in some situations involve rotating team members 
(Warner, et al., 2004).  Members of both the boarding party and air warfare teams each have 
distinct roles and bring their respective expertise (e.g., radiological detection) to bear, and 
combine their heterogeneous knowledge.   
 
Four unique but interdependent stages of team collaboration are included in the model.  As 
depicted in Figure 1, the stages include knowledge construction, collaborative team problem 
solving, team consensus, and outcome and evaluation and revision.   Cognitive processes within 
each stage are represented at two levels:  meta-cognitive processes, which guide the overall 
problem-solving process, and macro-cognitive processes, which support team members’ 
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activities within the respective collaboration stage.  The model’s macro-level definition of the 
cognitive processes permits empirical assessment of these cognitive processes with currently 
available measurement techniques (e.g., verbal protocol analysis, communication analysis).  
Analysis of data captured from teams performing their tasks in a collaborative environment can 
provide valuable insight into what constitutes effective collaboration performance.   
 
Knowledge construction begins with team members building individual task knowledge and the 
construction of team knowledge.  Knowledge represents a pattern that connects and generally 
provides a high level of predictability regarding what is described or what will happen next.  The 
focus of all the macro-level cognitive processes in the knowledge construction stage is to support 
individual and team knowledge development.  This knowledge will be used during collaborative 
team problem solving sessions to develop solution alternatives to the problem.   
 
During collaborative team problem solving sessions, team members communicate data, infor-
mation and knowledge to develop solution options to the problem (Bellinger, Castro, & Mills, 
2004).  The majority of collaboration occurs during this stage (Warner, et al., 2004).  The focus 
of the macro-cognitive processes during this stage is to support development of solution options 
for the collaborative problem.   
 
During team consensus the team negotiates solution options and reaches final agreement by all 
team members on a specific option.  The macro-cognitive processes support the team in reaching 
total agreement on the final solution to the problem.  During the outcome, evaluation and 
revision stage the team evaluates the selected solution option against the problem-solving goal 




Verbatim transcripts were analyzed from two series of experiments where teams collaborated to 
solve a complex problem. These decisionmaking domains included Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO) and air warfare decisionmaking scenarios. In both of these problem-solving 
tasks, assessment is particularly difficult because the available information is often incomplete or 
ambiguous. Transcripts included communications that occurred between all team members as 
well as with decisionmakers at the distributed sites. Our approach was to analyze and code team 
communications data using the cognitive process definitions developed by Warner, et al., (2004).  
The focus of the collaboration model is on knowledge building among the team members and 
developing team consensus for selection of a course of action.  This research builds on previous 
work to validate this model (Warner, et al, 2004). The current effort uses a similar methodology 
applied to two different decisionmaking scenarios.  
 
Experiment I:  Maritime Interdiction Operations 
 
An experiment was conducted to test the technical and operational challenges of developing a 
global Maritime Domain Security testbed.  One goal was to test the applicability of using a 
wireless network for data sharing during a Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) scenario to 
facilitate expert reach back for radiation source analysis and biometric data analysis. This 
technology aims to provide networking solutions for maritime interdiction operations where 
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subject matter experts at geographically distributed command centers collaborate with a boarding 
party in near real time to facilitate situational understanding and course of action selection.  
 
The objective of this experiment was to evaluate the use of networks, advanced sensors, and 
collaborative technology for rapid MIO. Specifically, the ability for a boarding party to rapidly 
set-up ship-to-ship communications that permit them to search for radiation and explosive sources 
while maintaining contact with the mother ship, command and control organizations, and 
collaborating with remotely located sensor experts.  
 
The boarding team boards the suspect vessel and establishes a collaborative network and then 
begins their respective inspections and data collection processes.  The boarding officer boards 
the vessel with his laptop so he can collaborate with all other members of the team.  This 
includes those who are located on the ship, but are physically spread out around different areas 
of the ship (while searching for contraband material and obtaining fingerprints of crew 
members), as well as the virtual members of the boarding team – the experts who are located at 
the different reach back centers. Since there are numerous commercial uses for certain 
radioactive sources, positive identification of the source in a short time is imperative. There is 
also pressure to conduct the MIO quickly so as to not detain the ship any longer than necessary.  
 
MIO Team Members.  Members of the boarding team include the following team members:  1) 
the Boarding Officer, a Coast Guard officer; 2) a representative from Lawrence Livermore 
National Labs (LLNL) with portable radiation detection devices and “reach-back” capability to 
LLNL; 3) a representative from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), who uses 
biometrics measurements of fingerprints and video imagery to be checked against databases at 
the remote facility; and 4) a representative from Special Operations Command (SOCOM), who 
provides guidance on handling hazardous material.  
  
Maritime Interdiction Operations Scenario.  Based on intelligence, the US Coast Guard has 
ordered one of its cutters to stop, board, and search a commercial vessel of foreign origin 
suspected of transporting uranium enriching equipment.  The boarding party brings radiation 
detection and biometric gear, drawings of dangerous equipment and people, and video recording 
capability. Data is collected on suspicious material, equipment, and people and sent to specific 
experts at distributed reach back centers.  A network extension capability was utilized from the 
cutter to the boarding team; the network was able to reach back to LLNL and DTRA to assist in 
identification of suspect cargo.  Support from the National Biometric Fusion Center was used to 
quickly and accurately discriminate between actual vessel crewmembers and non-crew suspect 
persons.  
 
The Groove collaborative workspace brought expert services into the boarding party team’s tool 
set and facilitated voice and text communications between all members of the virtual boarding 
party and physical boarding party. Remote sites were able to receive and open posted files in less 
then two minutes to begin their analysis. For example, expert services provided at LLNL quickly 
determined the need for additional data capture of longer length and different angles of approach.  
Requests were transmitted by text message and taken for action, and radiation source spectrum 
captures were made of suspect containers that were detected to have a radiation signature 
presence. Analysis of this data led the boarding officer to recommend that the vessel be 
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quarantined for further inspection. The biometric team took digital prints of the crew to be 
compared to known criminal prints and latent prints from terrorist and crime scenes.   
 
Cognitive Complexity of Scenarios.  Scenarios used for this research focus on detecting, 
identifying, and interdicting nuclear materials in open waters. The critical task involves the 
cognitively complex issue of discrimination, that is, how to determine the presence of contraband 
radiological material against a background containing multiple benign radiation sources.  
“Smoke detectors, radiant signs, and a container load of bananas all share the ability to be moved 
in commercial vehicles or vessels…and all three can cause radiation detectors to alarm.” 
(Schwoegler, 206, p.4). For example, “smoke detectors contain small amounts of americium, 
radiant signs glow because they contain tritium, a radioactive hydrogen isotope, and bananas, 
contain a small fraction of potassium-40 which emits ionizing radiation.” (ibid, p. 4).   
 
Technical expertise, provided by remotely-located experts, is required to interpret the scientific 
signals emitted from complex detectors to enable on-site personnel to make the fine 
discriminations required. Performing these complex discriminations is made possible by the 
collaborative capability provided by the collaborative workspace in terms of bringing remote 
expertise to the vessel undergoing the search and the ability to rapidly send and receive 
communications between a diverse team of experts who all bring their respective expertise to 
bear with a potentially high-threat situation.  The search, identification, and final decisions need 
to be conducted rapidly as the economic and political ramifications of detaining a commercial 
cargo vessel are great.  On a commercial vessel that is under way, false positives can prove 
economically costly and politically embarrassing.   
 
Detecting a moving vessel emitting signs of ionizing radiation involves initial detection by a 
local police maritime unit.  This initial detection then triggers the need for Coast Guard officers 
to board the vessel and take in-depth readings with portable radiation-detection instruments. 
These readings are immediately relayed to scientific experts, at geographically distributed 
locations, and the analyzed results are electronically sent back to the boarding vessel for use by 
first responders on the scene.   
 
Experiment II:  Air Warfare Decisionmaking   
 
Air warfare decisionmaking is conducted in the combat information center of a Navy ship. The 
team has responsibility for identification of a large number of air tracks under high time pressure. 
These air tracks can fit multiple hypotheses regarding the level of threat they pose to the 
battlegroup due to the high level of ambiguity associated with the data. The nature of the data, 
the complex judgments required, and a sociotechnical environment that is characterized by high 
workload, and high stakes, all combine to create an extremely challenging problem for the air 
warfare team.   
 
Incoming information arrives via various sensor systems (radar, electronic support measures 
system, identification friend or foe, etc.), and various reports, e.g., intelligence reports, other 
platforms in the area pass messages regarding situation reports on various tracks, and so on.  All 
these reports are passed by the team member who operates that sensor, or who receives the 
message, to the rest of the team over any of several communications systems. These reports are 
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generally heard by all other team members as they are all on the same communications net, 
although the reports are typically addressed to a specific team member/s, and sometimes they are 
addressed to “all.” The two key decisionmakers are the commanding officer and the tactical 
action officer.   
 
Reports on specific tracks are interleaved with reports on other tracks. Communications between 
team members are passed as soon as new information is received and updated reports are passed 
as soon as new information is obtained for any track.  So, for example, in a series of speech 
turns, five separate contacts may be discussed at various levels – initial reports, updated reports, 
sharing information on the response, or lack of response, by the contact to some action taken by 
the ship, etc.  Five consecutive reports could pertain to five separate tracks or all reports could 
pertain to one track. 
 
Air Warfare Team Members.  Six collocated team members consisted of the commanding 
officer (CO), tactical action officer (TAO), air warfare coordinator (AAWC), electronic warfare 
supervisor (EWS), identification supervisor (IDS) and tactical information coordinator (TIC). 
These combat information center team members also communicated with several non-collocated 
information sources, e.g., the battle group commander, the Saudi air tower, assets passing 
intelligence reports, other ships and friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the battlegroup, to gather 
additional information from them and keep them apprised of the unfolding scenario as they 
collaborated to identify air tracks.  
 
Air Warfare Decisionmaking Scenario.  The global air warfare task involves identification and 
responding to numerous contacts.  When an aircraft (or a surface contact) is detected, CIC 
personnel work as a team to determine the identity and to try to determine whether or not the 
aircraft poses a threat. The high degree of inherent ambiguity associated with contact information 
can often make threat assessment a very difficult task.  This is because many pieces of data fit 
multiple hypotheses regarding threat assessment.  The global response choices (that is, engage, 
monitor, do nothing) are largely determined by the ship’s orders and the current geopolitical 
situation. Specific actions (such as, change course, issue verbal warnings, illuminate with radar, 
challenge with other sensors, etc.) depend on the local conditions and the relative positions of the 
inbound contact of interest an own-ship. Determining which of these actions is likely to be 
effective depends on maintaining an accurate threat assessment which requires continually 
updating based on iterative situation assessments.   
 
Critical air contacts are identified based on ambiguous information under time pressure to 
determine if the track posed a threat to the ship.  One of the most challenging aspects of the 
combat information center teams’ job is the high mental workload that is entailed when a 
constant stream of information must be continuously evaluated, particularly when the 
information often pertains to several different air contacts (or “tracks”). Relevant data/ 
information items must be associated with the right track number, then analyzed, synthesized and 
aggregated.  This task places an extremely high load on working memory. The air warfare team 
must assess, compare, and resolve conflicting information, while making difficult judgments and 
remembering the status of several evolving situations. These tasks are interleaved with other 
tasks, such a making reports to higher authority and requesting assets. 
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In general, the overall task of responding to air warfare scenarios consists of situation assessment 
(“what’s going on”) and action selection (“what to do about it”). Recent theories of decision-
making emphasize the importance of situation assessment for good decisionmaking in 
naturalistic, event-driven situations (Hutchins, 1995). Moreover, they stress that decisions 
regarding actions to be taken are a by-product of developing the situation awareness that 
precedes action selection.   
 
Coding Process 
Cognitive process coding definitions developed by Warner, et al. (2004) were used to code all 
speech turns. The coders attempted to develop criteria for applying the coding schema as a 
number of coding categories appear to have similar meanings. This codification of the coding 
process is part of the overall validation of the model, in that one goal is to have high inter-rater 
reliability between coders. It was important to pay attention to which track a team member was 
talking about when coding the speech turns.  (This could sometimes be challenging because the 
last time a track was discussed may have several pages previously in the transcript and 
sometimes the person speaking did not always state the track number that was being discussed.  
In these situations the rater, by careful reading of the communications, was able to infer which 
track the speech turn referred to.)  
 
The first time they discussed a track the speech turn was coded as a 2 (individual mental model 
(IMM) construction – where an individual team member, using available information, develops 
his/her mental picture of the problem situation). After three speech turns that discussed the same 
track (typically involving at least four, of the six or more team members) it was coded as a 4 
(team knowledge development (TKM) – where all team members participate in clarifying 
information to build team knowledge.  Once five-six team members had discussed a track, and at 
least 4 of the 6 team members had been involved in discussing this particular track, it was coded 
as a 10 – team shared understanding development – which includes discussion among all team 
members on a particular topic or data item.  
 
Some exceptions to the above mentioned coding criteria include: When a team member 
addresses “All stations, [track # 7010 is a comm-air.]” this means he is telling all team members 
this evaluation of the track.  Because it was addressed to all team members and it reported a 
higher level/ more final assessment of the track, i.e., it is a commercial airliner, this was coded as 
a 10. As more team members get involved in discussing a contact (i.e., more reports and/or 
updates have been shared among team members, the cognitive process coding category reflects a 




Table 1 presents the cognitive process definitions developed for the model of team collaboration. 
We added new examples for each coding category, based on our analysis of the air warfare 
scenarios, to provide illustrative examples of the types of communications that fall under each of 
the coding categories. (The original set of cognitive process definitions included examples from 
a non-combatant evacuation scenario.) These examples of the coding categories are contained in 
Table 1.  
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New Coding Categories 
 
During the analysis phase new coding categories emerged when coding the air warfare scenarios. 
These new categories include 21–23, miscellaneous, issue an order regarding a course of action, 
and request a person take some action. Examples of these categories are included in Table 1 
which includes the original coding categories. Miscellaneous category includes getting the 
attention of a team member (e.g., “TAO this is EW”) prior to speaking (so as not to waste time 
speaking if the team member is busy and not ready to listen to the message), acknowledging a 
request to speak, acknowledging a message, e.g., “Copy all,” and issuing a verbal warning to the 
potential threat track over the radio system.  Because standard operational procedure for 
communicating requires that significant communications be acknowledged, this wound up being 
the largest category of communications. 
 
Issuing an order regarding a course of action appears to be a significant coding category.  This 
refers to situations where a person with higher rank (e.g., commanding officer speaking to the 
tactical action officer (TAO), or the TAO speaking to one of the enlisted system operators, tells 
them to take some specific action against a potential threat track. These actions include issuing 
verbal warnings, illuminating or locking-on with radar, developing a firing solution, covering 
with missiles, etc. This category also includes responding/ reporting they have taken the action, 
or acknowledging the order. 
 
Request a team member take some action refers to telling a team member to do something but it 
is not a direct action against a threat track.  For example, “Can you try and change 7006 and 
7005 to assumed hostile.  I keep trying and can’t get it to do it.”  
 
Other potential new categories include Prodding a team member to jog their awareness, e.g., to 
make sure they are following the discussion, or they push or suggest to one or more team 
members to go out and generate knowledge, e.g., “You should go back and see if there is …”.  
This person directing or suggesting might act in a role as teacher gently pushing the collaborative 
effort in a certain way. Another potential new category is for “Contrarians” when a person says 
“Let’s re-evaluate/ reconsider, or when the person disagrees with the current thinking of the 
team.  This would be an “outlier” who makes the team consider another viewpoint, or “pulls 
back the reins.”  As additional scenarios are analyzed and coded new categories may emerge. 
 
Table 1.  Cognitive Process Definitions  
(From Warner, Letsky, and Cowan, 2004) 
 
 Cognitive Process Definitions  
 
  1.  Metacognition dti: individual conversion of data to information = individual team member  
      converting data to information. 
• “We have Don-2 bearing 086 and LN-66 bearing 097.”(converted detected radar  
         parameters –data to information – names of radars on specific bearings) 
• “I am showing 8044 at 400 knots and about 27 thousand feet, possible comm-air type 
         profile.” 
• “I have a second contact at 1000 feet.”  
 
  2. Macrocognition imm: individual mental model construction = individual team member, using  
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     available information, develops his/her mental picture of problem situation. 
• “8030 definitely originated from Iranian airspace?  The possible helo?” 
• “That’s affirmative, sir.” 
• “APQ-120 bears 072 off possible Foxtrot 4 Delta or Echo.” 
• “We have 8053, that air unknown coming in up there.” 
• “2017 is squawking a comm-air mode 3.  In company with 2025, but that track is much  
        lower than the comm-air.  One at 37000, one at 8000 just came in low.” 
   
 
  3. Macrocognition itk: individual task knowledge development = individual team member asking 
       for clarification to data or information; response to clarification. 
• “Do we have the track number for his CAP?  I would prefer to have the track number for 
        his CAP.” 
• “Are you covering with birds?” 
• “That’s affirmative, sir.” 
• “Did you illuminate him?”  (clarifying action has been taken) 
• “Did you establish communications with him?” 
• “Since he is turning to the east do you still want us to continue with level one?”  
        (clarification of actions to be taken) 
• “That’s a negative.”  (response) 
• “The Desert Eagle don’t have that information for you right now. I asked them to get that  
        for us.  Whether the F-1s were clean or dirty.”  
   
  4. Macrocognition tk: team knowledge development = All team members participate in clarifying 
       (i.e. answering a question) information to build team knowledge. 
• “Rainbow is sending Desert Eagle 101 and Desert Eagle 102 over to investigate track  
        8037 (TN 7034).” 
• “He looks like he is on a [air] corridor, Kuwait City to Bushehr.” 
• “Received ESM of Cyrano 4 bears 121 off the F-1.” (I) --- information 
• “No response track 8070.” (I) --- information 
• “I don’t have mode 3 or any other type of IFF available to me right now.”   
• “They’re going too fast for that.”  
• “Looks like he’s comm-air, he’s high and looks like a comm-air profile.” 
   
  5. Macrocognition ko: knowledge object development = pictures, icons or standard text, developed 
      by an individual team member or the whole team, that represents a standard meaning to the   
      team.  
               --- [No coded examples for air warfare] 
   
  6. 
 
Macrocognition vrm:  individual visualization and representation of meaning 
Visualization = individual team members use methods (e.g., graphs, pictures) to  
transfer meaning to other team members. 
Representation = individual team members use methods to sort data and information 
into meaningful chunks. 
        --- [No coded examples for air warfare] 
 
  7. 
 
Metacognition cu:  team integration of individual knowledge for common understanding = all 
      team members combine individual pieces of knowledge to achieve a common understanding. 
• “Track 7005 has turned west and is now inbound, sir.”  
• “He’s holding in altitude, he’s not far from the air way, he flew out of good guys country 
        and we have a comm-air radar.  Let’s make him assumed friend.”    
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  8. Macrocognition kio: knowledge interoperability development = team members exchanging  
    knowledge among each other. 
• “Desert Eagles report “tally ho” on section of two Iranian F-1s, out.” ---(derived  
       knowledge from aircraft providing a visual identification) 
• “We have Primus 40, bears 135, Gulfstream 2, possible Super Puma.” 
• “It looks like the AWACs is feet dry. The CAP, composition 2, appear to be headed feet  
       dry now.” 
• “Doctrine won’t work for 2017, make unknown assumed enemy.”  
   
  9. 
 
Macrocognition ica: iterative information collection and analysis = collecting and analyzing  
    information to come up with a solution but no specific solution mentioned. 
• “No response initial warning, track 8037.” 
• “We need a report from CAP as to whether those, upon intercept of those suspected 
         Pumas, whether they are armed or not.”  
• “Track 2017 deviated from known flight path still maintaining altitude and still squawking 
         the same mode 3.” 
 
10. 
   
Macrocognition tsu: team shared understanding development = discussion among all team 
     members on a particular topic or data item (i.e. discussion does not involve answering questions)
• “Track 8061 bearing 027 Princeton at 25 miles, 5000 feet, heading south, covering with 
        birds.” 
• “It looks like he is turning to the west.”  
• “You need to watch him closely here.”  
• “Track 8061 appeared to originate from Iran.  When we picked him up he was already off 
         the coast but he was coming south from close to the Iranian coast. I can’t confirm that he 
         came from Iran but he was coming from that direction.”  
• “I am showing a CPA of 43 miles to the south at their current heading.”  
• “Cyrano 4, that emitter has ceased.  Last bearing for Cyrano 4 was 122.” 
• “OK, what do we think about the Saudi CAP? Shot down, too low to communicate?” 
• “It looks like we still have a good track on them, 27 at 13000.  Probably just poor comms 
        with the AWACS.” 
• “Continue to track sections of Iranian F-1s and F-4s. Approached the force with an attack 
        profile.  Interrogated level 1 with no response.  They turned away from the force at a 
        range of abut 30 miles.  Continuing to track.” 
 
11. 
   
Macrocognition sa: develop, rationalize and visualize solution alternatives = using data to 
      justify a solution 
• “I would like fire control lock up on 7010 and I’d like to make sure he is designated as a 
gun target.  I’d like to have two rounds of illumination prepped on mount 52.” 
• “My intentions are to issue a warning shot with a flare if the helo proceeds to within ten 
nautical miles, over.” 
• “Indicate to 7010 that if he continues to close he can expect defensive actions.” 
• “Track number 7010 continuing inbound, request permission to engage at three nautical 
        miles, no response to all measures, so far.” 
   
12. 
   
Macrocognition cmm: convergence of individual mental models to team mental model =  
      convincing other team members to accept specific data, information or knowledge 
• “OK, we need to make them assumed enemy and cover them , AAWC.” 
   
13. 
   
Metacognition cs: team agreement on a common solution = all team members agree on the final 
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      plan. 
• “Listen up.  8044 is a probable comm-air, 8100 is an assumed hostile.” 
• “8044 looks like a comm-air profile.” 
• “ID 2010 unknown assumed friend.”  
• “Request batteries release on track 7010, it is continuing inbound, he is at three nautical 
miles, request permission to engage, over.” 
   
14. 
   
Macrocognition tn: team negotiation of solution alternatives = team negotiation of solution  
       alternatives ending in a final solution option. (solution options are defined for each of the 
       five components of the final plan --- i.e. personnel, transportation, weapons, critical times and  
       detail plan) 
               --- [No coded examples for air warfare] 
   
15. 
   
Macrocognition tpr: team pattern recognition = the team as a whole identifies a pattern of data,  
      information or knowledge. 
               --- [No coded examples for air warfare] 
   
16. Macrocognition ct: critical thinking = Team working together toward a common goal, whereby goal accomplishment requires an active exchange of ideas, self-regulatory judgment, and 
systematic consideration of evidence, counterevidence, and context, in an environment where 
judgments are made under uncertainty, and there is limited knowledge and time (Hess & Freeman, 
2004).  
1. critical thinking is measured as a composite of: (Warner & Wroblewski, 2004; 
Hess & Freeman, 2004) 
• MCitk: individual task knowledge development = individual team 
member clarifying data; asking for clarification.  
• MetCcu:  team integration of individual knowledge for common       
understanding = one or more team members combine individual pieces 
of knowledge to achieve a common understanding. 
 
• MCkio: knowledge interoperability = team members exchanging     
knowledge among each other. 
• MCsa: develop, rationalize and visualize solution alternatives = using 
data to  justify a solution 
 
Note: one critical thinking frequency count = oneMCitk +oneMetCcu + 
MCkio + MCsa                 
   
17. 
   
Macrocognition shk: sharing hidden knowledge = individual team members sharing their  
      knowledge through prompting by other team member(s). 
• “We still have no level two warnings out to those guys.” 
• “Yes sir, we ID’d him as a com[mercial] earlier, we will go ahead and talk to him.” 
• “I’ve got track 7011 ID’d as com-air.  He started out at 35,000 feet, now he is descending.”
   
18. 
   
Metacognition sag: solution adjustment against goal and exit criteria = team as a whole  
      compares complete solution option against goal and exit criteria. 
• “Ceased illumination 8005, maintaining lock on 8005.  Turning outbound.”  
   
19. 
   
Macrocognition csg: compare solution options against goal(s) = team members discuss solution  
      options (i.e. any of the five solution components) against the scenario goal (i.e. rescue 3 red 
      cross workers within 24 hrs). 
• “Ah Rainbow’s holding track number 7011, low and slow and inbound.  Do you desire me 
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       to cover with birds also?” 
   
20. 
   
Macrocognition aro: analyze, revise solution options = team members analyze final solution 
options (i.e. any of the five solution components) and revise if necessary. 
               --- [No coded examples for air warfare] 
   
21. 
   
Miscellaneous:  misc = acknowledging a message, asking for repeat of message, verbal warning 
• “Copy all, out.” 
• “What was your last?”  
• Verbal warning issued to inboard aircraft 
   
22. 
   
Issue order regarding a course of action:  coa = a superior in the chain of command tells a team  
member to take a specific action against a possible threat track. 
• “Cover 8032 (TN 7013) with standard missile also generate a SWG 1A solution 
        on him.” 
• “Cease illumination.” 
• “Let’s start level ones, 8070.” 
   
23. 
   
Request take action:  rta = team member requests another team member take some action. 
• “Let’s investigate with CAP.” 
• “Confirm that tracks originating from Iranian air space are designated unknown 
        assumed hostile.” 
• “Have SWC develop a Harpoon solution on him.”  
• “Go ahead and tag 8037 as F-1s.” 
• “Make 8037 and company assumed hostile.” 
• “Shift your focus Air to 8070, inbound helo.” 
• “Increase speed as well.” 
 
For the MIO scenario, 52% of the speech turns contained content related to solving the problem; 
48% involved administrative types of communications  Evidence for twelve of the twenty-two 
cognitive processes included in the model were found.  For the air warfare scenario, 99% of the 
speech turns contained content related to solving the problem; 1% involved administrative types 
of communications  Evidence for fifteen of the twenty-three cognitive processes included in the 
model were found.  Multiple occurrences for most of these cognitive processes were found in 
both scenarios.   
 
Table 2 presents the cognitive process coding tallies for the four air warfare scenarios.  The large 
number of speech turns coded as itk reflects the high degree of uncertainty inherent in air warfare 
decisionmaking tasks.  An interesting example of sharing hidden knowledge (17) occurred when 
the CO issued an order to issue a verbal warning and “lock up” the inbound aircraft.  The next 
speech turn involved the TAO replying “Yes, sir, we identified him as a com[mercial aircraft] 
earlier, we will go ahead and talk to him.”  In this situation, the TAO was gently reminding the 
CO of a critical piece of information that he had forgotten.  The large number of speech turns 
coded as categories 1-4 reflects the huge emphasis on individual knowledge construction for the 
air warfare task.  Similarly, that examples of all six categories in the collaborative team problem 
solving phase – where teams integrate individual knowledge for common understanding – had 
many speech turns coded as these categories also indicates the large role these cognitive 
processes play for air warfare teams.  In contrast, the small percentage of speech turns that were 
coded as cognitive processes associated with team consensus and outcome evaluation and 
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revision indicated that the course of action selection phase of air warfare is not conducted in a 
collaborative manner.  
 
 
Table 2.  Cognitive Process Coding Tallies for Air Warfare and MIO Scenarios. 
 




















   Knowledge Construction         
1. 
 
Data to information (dti)   1  4  - 37   2  5  - 
2. 
 
Individual mental model (imm)   8 11 18 25  1  7  8 
3. 
 
Individual task knowledge 
development (itk) 
25   30 31 29 35  7 47 
4. 
 
Team knowledge development (tk) 11   5 18 1 3  5  8 
5. 
 
Knowledge object development (ko)  -  -  -  -  -  2  8 
6. 
 
Visualization and representation (vrm)  -  -  -  - -  -  - 
  Collaborative Team Problem Solving        
7. 
 
Common understanding (cu)  -   6  -   2  6  7 
8. 
 
Knowledge interoperability (kio)  -   5  - 1  2  - 10 
9. 
 
Iterative collection and analysis (ica)   1  11  -  -  6  4 14 
10. 
 
Team shared understanding (tsu)   1  17 28 34  3  2  3 
11. 
 
Solution alternatives (sa)  -   3  -  -  6  -  - 
12. 
 
Convergence of mental models (cmm)   1  -  -  -  1  -  - 
13. 
 
Agreement on Common solution (cs)  -   2  -  -   -  - 
  Team Consensus          
14. 
 
Team negotiation (tn)  -   -  -  -  4  -  - 
15. 
 
Team pattern recognition (tpr)  -   -  -  -  -  -  - 
16. 
 
Critical thinking (ct)  -   -  -  -  -  -  - 
17. 
 
Sharing hidden knowledge (shk)  -   2  - -  -  - - 
18. 
 
Solution adjustment against goal (sag)  -   -  -  -   -  - 
  Outcome Evaluation and Revision         
19. 
 
Compare solution options against goals 
(csg) 
 -   1  -  -  -  -  - 
20. 
 
Analyze, revise solutions (aro)  -   -  -  -  -  -  - 
21. 
 
Miscellaneous (misc) 38 27 57 61  6  -  - 
22. 
 
Issue order regarding course of action 
(coa) 
  7 5 17 37  -  -  2 
23. 
 
Request take action (rta)   3 2 18 8  1  2 11 
 
 
Totals 96 131 187 233 73 40 118 
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Table 3 presents an excerpt of the communications coding from the MIO scenario where the 
team is developing solution alternatives by using data to justify a solution.  First (1), individual 
TMs are clarifying data regarding the degree of danger inherent in the material discovered (2) 
and exchanging knowledge among each other, i.e., the material needs to be confiscated (3), 
based on information provided by one of the remote centers (the material needs to be handled 
carefully). An individual exchanges knowledge with other TMs (4) to develop knowledge 
interoperability regarding whether the Coast Guard ship has a suitable storage area for the 
confiscated material (5).  Finally, TMs combine individual pieces of knowledge to achieve a 
common understanding (6) regarding the next action to be taken.   
 
Table 3.  Excerpt from MIO Scenario Communications Coding: 
Developing Solution Alternatives. 
 
 MIO Team Communications Cognitive Process Coding 
 Speaker Code 
1 DTRA Cesium 137 can be used to make an RDD.  
If there are no explosives, then it is not 
configured as a weapon yet. Recommend 
material be confiscated. 
MCsa 
 
Develop, rationalize and visualize  
solution alternatives; using data to  
justify a solution 




Individual task knowledge develop-ment; 
individual TM clarifying data. 
3 BO Make sure you handle carefully.  Cs-137 
is an external gamma hazard. 
MCkio 
 
Knowledge interoperability:  TMs  
exchanging knowledge among each other. 




Knowledge interoperability:  TMs  
exchanging knowledge among each other. 
5 SOCOM Does CG ship have proper storage area 
for material confiscated? 
MCitk 
 
Individual task knowledge development: 
individual TM clarifying data, asking for 
clarification. 
6 SOCOM Search team will report size of material 
and its current containment condition; 
then make recommendations. 
MetCcu 
 
Team integration of individual TM  
knowledge for common understanding; 
one or more TMs combine individual 




Table 4.  MIO Scenario Communications Coding: 
Knowledge Interoperability Development and Agreement on a Final Plan. 
 
 MIO Team Communications Cognitive Process Coding 
 Speaker Code 
1 BO Negative for explosives Station 2. MCkio 
 
Knowledge interoperability:  TMs exchanging 
knowledge among each other. 
2 LLNL Finally received RAD data from 
station 2.   
MCkio 
 
Knowledge interoperability:  TMs exchanging 
knowledge among each other. 
3 SOCOM Will need to resolve RAD 
containment hazard if it exists. 
MetCcu Team integration of individual TM knowledge 
for common understanding; one or more TMs 
combine individual pieces of knowledge to 
achieve common understanding. 
4 DTRA If you have plutonium, you need 
to confiscate.  It’s an alpha 
MCkio Iterative information collection and analysis; 
collecting and analyzing information to come up 
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hazard, but still must be handled 
carefully. 
 with a solution but no specific solution exists. 
5 BO Roger. Misc Acknowledge report. 
6 DTRA By the way, if plutonium is in 
solid metal form, your team can 
handle safely with rubber gloves 
and a dental face mask, 
depending on how much is there. 
Macica 
 
Team shared understanding development – 
discussion among all team members on a 
particular topic or data item.. 
7 BO Talking to search team to see if 
this is within their capabilities or 
if we will need outside assets. 
MCkio 
 
Iterative information collection and analysis; 
collecting and analyzing information to come up 
with a solution but no specific solution exists. 
8 LLNL Hazard is probably minimal, can 
isolate and confiscate. 
Metcs Team agreement on a common solution – all tem 





Differences between the two scenarios in terms of how the team’s behavior maps to the model of 
team collaboration were noted. One difference was that course of action selection during the air 
warfare tasks tends to be done less collaboratively than it is in other decisionmaking domains, 
e.g., a maritime interdiction operation scenario, due to the inherent time pressure to make 
decisions and take actions. Decisions tend to be made unilaterally by the tactical action officer or 
the commanding officer, (sometimes these two collaborate) but do not typically involve 
discussion with the rest of the team. Decisions regarding course of action selection entailed very 
little collaboration for the air warfare tasks due to the speed of the potential threat aircraft. When 
actions need to be taken very quickly in an attempt to determine the intent of an inbound track, 
and a series of gradually escalating actions are required, time is not available to discuss 
alternative courses of action. 
 
In general, the overall task of responding to air warfare scenarios consists of situation assessment 
(“what’s going on”) and action selection (“what to do about it”). Klein (1989) found that when 
decisionmakers use a recognition-primed decisionmaking strategy to perform decisionmaking 
tasks, usually the situation itself either determines or constrains the response options and that 
experienced decisionmakers make up to 90% of all decisions without considering alternatives. If 
the situation appears similar to one that the decision maker has previously experienced, the 
pattern will be recognized and the course of action is usually immediately obvious. The 
recognition primed model of decisionmaking fuses two processes—situation assessment and 
mental simulation (Klein, 1993). In the simplest case the situation is recognized as familiar or 
prototypical, using feature matching, and the obvious response is implemented. In a more 
complex case the decisionmaker performs a conscious evaluation of the response, using mental 
simulation to uncover problems prior to implementing the response. In the most complex case 
the evaluation reveal flaws requiring modification, or the option is judged inadequate and 




Analysis of data captured from teams performing their tasks in a collaborative environment can 
provide valuable insight into what constitutes effective collaborative performance. This 
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understanding can then be used to develop technology to support this cognitive activity, develop 
tools to reduce cognitive workload, and techniques and processes to improve information 
exchange among collaborating members.  Future plans include additional analysis for more 
complex scenarios and analysis of the contribution made by providing collaborative tools to 
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1EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF A 
MODEL OF 
TEAM COLLABORATION
Susan G. Hutchins, Alex Bordetsky, Anthony Kendall, 
and Eugene Bourakov
Naval Postgraduate School
Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences Department
Monterey, CA  93943
2NPS Testbed for Team Collaboration 
Model Validation
Objective
• Better understand cognitive  
processes employed when 
teams collaborate to solve 
problems
Approach
• Analyze team communications                                    
data using cognitive process
definitions 
• Validate and refine the model 
of team collaboration 
Data Analyzed
• Three Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) experiments
• Four Air Warfare scenarios
• Firefighters 9-11
3Team Collaboration Model Validation
GOAL: Understand and improve effectiveness of team decisionmaking in
complex, data-rich situations by validating model of team collaboration 
Model of Team Collaboration Defines:
– Meta-cognitive processes that guide team collaboration
– Information processing components the team performs to achieve  
each collaborative stage
– Communication mechanisms used by the team to build the          
necessary knowledge
– Emphasizes cognitive aspects of collaboration process — includes 
major cognitive processes that underlie this type of communication: 
(1)  Individual knowledge building 
(2)  Knowledge interoperability 
(3)  Team shared understanding and 
(4)  Team consensus (Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2004)  
– Validate that these processes exist and how they contribute to  
team performance through verbal protocol analysis coding of     
team communications.
4Types of Problem Solving Situations
• Ill-Structured Decisionmaking Tasks
• Time Pressure
• Dynamic Information
• High Information Uncertainty
• High Cognitive Workload 
• Human System Interface 
Complexity
5Team Types







• Rotating Team Members
Operational Tasks
• Team Data Processing
• Developing Shared Situational Awareness
• Team Decisionmaking and Course of Action Selection
6Meta-Cognitive:
• individual conversion of
data to knowledge
Macro-Cognitive:












• large amount of knowledge 
(cognitive overload)








• command structure 
(hierarchical vs. flat)
• rotating team members
Operational Tasks
• team decision making, COA 
selection

















Collaboration Stages & Cognitive Processes
• team integration of individual
knowledge for common understanding
• knowledge interoperability 
development 
• iterative information collection
and analysis
• team shared understanding 
development
• develop, rationalize, & visualize
solution alternatives
• convergence of individual mental
models to team mental model
• individual task, team and domain
knowledge development
• developing new knowledge
• team agreement on situation
• team agreement on a common
solution
• team negotiation of solution
alternatives
• team pattern recognition
• team shared understanding
development 
• convergence of individual 
mental models
• critical thinking
• sharing hidden knowledge
• individual task knowledge 
development 
• team task knowledge
development 
• solution adjustment to
fit goals and exit criteria
• compare problem solution  
against goals
• team shared understanding
development
• convergence of individual 
mental models of solution
• analyze, revise output
Knowledge 
Construction
• individual task, team and domain
knowledge development
• individual knowledge object
development
• individual visualization and 
representation of meaning
Mechanisms for achieving Meta and Macro -Cognitive Processes (applies to all stages)
• Verbal communications: representing and discussing individual information, discussing team generated information,
questioning, agreeing / disagreeing, negotiating perspectives,,       discussing possible solutions, providing rationale.
• Non-Verbal communications: facial expressions, voice clues (vocal paralanguage), hand gestures, body movements(kinesics)
touch (haptics), personal space, drawing, text messages, augmented video, 
MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION
: 
affordances   (cognition in objects). 
Focus on Macro-Cognition (September, 2005)
Office of Naval Research
Collaboration and Knowledge Management (CKM) Program
7Method
• Verbatim transcripts analyzed from two series of exp’ts and one real-
world event where teams collaborated to solve a complex problem
– Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
– Air warfare decisionmaking 
– Firefighters from 9-11
• In all three problem-solving tasks, assessment is difficult because 
available information is often incomplete or ambiguous. 
– Transcripts include communications between all team members   
and decisionmakers at distributed sites. 
• Analyze and code team communications data using the cognitive 
process definitions developed by Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2004.
– Focus of collaboration model is on knowledge building among  
team members and developing team consensus for selection of     
a course of action 
– Builds on previous work to validate model (Warner, et al, 2004) 
– Similar methodology applied to three different DMg tasks 
8Experiment I:  Maritime Interdiction Operations
• Tech’l/oper’l challenges of developing global Maritime Domain Security 
– Wireless network for data sharing during MIO to facilitate reachback for 
radiation source analysis and biometric data analysis
– Networking solutions for MIO where subject matter experts at 
geographically distributed command centers collaborate with 
boarding party in near real time to facilitate SA / COA selection 
• Evaluate networks, adv’d sensors, and collaborative tech’y for rapid MIO
– Rapidly set up ship-to-ship communications that permit them to 
search for radiation/ explosive sources while maintaining contact 
with mother ship, C2 organizations, and collaborating with remotely 
located sensor experts 
• Boarding team boards suspect vessel, establishes collaborative network
and begins inspections and data collection process 
– Boarding officer boards vessel with his laptop so he can collaborate  
with all other members of the team 
– Co-located on the ship, physically spread out (searching for 
contraband material and obtaining fingerprints of crew members)
– Virtual members of the boarding team – experts at reachback centers
– Commercial uses for certain radioactive sources, positive 
identification of the source in a short time is imperative 
– Pressure to conduct the MIO quickly so as to not detain the ship
9MIO Team Members
• Members of the boarding team
– Boarding Officer, a Coast Guard officer 
– Representative from Lawrence Livermore National 
Labs (LLNL) with portable radiation detection 
devices and “reach-back” capability to LLNL 
– Representative from the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA), who uses biometrics 
measurements of fingerprints and video imagery to 
be checked against databases at the remote facility
– Representative from Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM), who provides guidance on handling 
hazardous material. 
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Maritime Interdiction Operations Scenario
• US Coast Guard ordered cutter to stop, board, and search       
commercial vessel of foreign origin suspected of transporting   
uranium enriching equipment 
• Boarding party brings radiation detection/ biometric gear, drawings    
of dangerous equipment and people, and video recording capability 
• Data collected on suspicious material, equipment, and people and
sent to specific experts at distributed reachback centers 
• Groove collaborative workspace brought expert services into the 
boarding party team’s tool set 
– Facilitated voice and text communications between all members   
of the virtual boarding party and physical boarding party 
• Requests, transmitted by text message -- taken for action, and 
radiation source spectrum captures were made of suspect     
containers that were detected to have a radiation signature presence 
• Analysis led BO to recommend vessel be quarantined for further 
inspection
• Biometric team took digital prints of the crew to be compared to




• Air warfare DMg - conducted in combat information center of Navy ship 
• Identification of large number of air tracks under high time pressure 
– Multiple hypotheses regarding threat level posed to the battlegroup 
due to high level of ambiguity associated with the data 
– Nature of the data, complex judgments required, and socio-
technical environment characterized by high workload, and high 
stakes, create challenging problem for the air warfare team  
• Incoming info arrives via various sensor systems (radar, electronic 
sup’t measures system, identification friend or foe, etc.), various 
reports, e.g., intell, other platforms in area pass messages regarding 
situation
• Reports passed to rest of team over any of several comm’s systems 
– Heard by all team members, reports typically addressed to    
specific team member/s, sometimes addressed to “all”
– Communications passed as soon as information is received; 
updated reports are passed as soon as new information is obtained 
• Reports on specific tracks interleaved with reports on other tracks 
– In a series of speech turns, five separate contacts may be 
discussed at  various levels – initial reports, updated reports, 
sharing information on response/ lack of response, by contact to
action taken by the ship, etc.
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Air Warfare Team Members
• Six collocated team members consisted of 
– Commanding officer (CO) 
– Tactical action officer (TAO) 
– Air warfare coordinator (AAWC) 
– Electronic warfare supervisor (EWS) 
– Identification supervisor (IDS)
– Tactical information coordinator (TIC) 
• Combat information center team members also communicate 
with several non-collocated information sources
– Battle group commander
– Saudi air tower 
– Assets passing intelligence reports
– Other ships and friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the battle 
group
• Gather additional information, keep them apprised of the 
unfolding scenario as they collaborated to identify air tracks. 
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Air Warfare Decisionmaking
• Identification/ responding to numerous air contacts: CIC personnel 
work as a team to identify/ determine if A/C poses a threat 
– High ambiguity often makes threat assessment a very difficult task 
– Many pieces of data fit multiple hypotheses
– Global response choices (engage, monitor, do nothing) largely 
determined by ship’s orders and the current geopolitical situation 
– Specific actions (e.g., change course, issue verbal warnings, 
illuminate with radar, challenge with other sensors, etc.) depend on 
local conditions, relative positions of the inbound contact and ship 
• Determining which actions is likely to be effective depends on 
maintaining an accurate assessment which requires continually 
updating based on iterative situation assessments  
• Critical contacts ident’d based on ambiguous info. under time pressure 
• High mental workload -- constant stream of info. must be continuously 
evaluated, e.g., when info often pertains to several different contacts 
• Teams assess, compare, and resolve conflicting info, make difficult 
judgments and remember the status of several evolving situations
• Tasks interleaved with other tasks, such a making reports to higher   
authority and requesting assets
• Situation assessment & action selection
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Coding Process
• Cognitive process coding definitions used to code speech turns 
• Attempted to develop criteria for coding schema 
• Codification of the coding process is part of the overall validation of the 
model, e.g., goal is to have high inter-rater reliability between coders 
• Important to pay attention to which track a team member was talking about 
when coding the speech turns  
• First time discuss a track -- coded as a 2 (individual mental model (IMM) 
construction – where an individual team member, using available info,  
develops his/ her mental picture of the problem situation) 
• After three speech turns discussing the same track (typically involving at least 
four, of the six or more team members) it was coded as a 4 (team knowledge 
development (TKM) – where all team members participate in clarifying 
information to build team knowledge  
• Once five-six team members had discussed a track, and at least 4 of the 6 team 
members had been involved in discussing this particular track, it was coded as 
a 10 – team shared understanding development – which includes discussion 
among all team members on a particular topic or data item 
• Exceptions to the coding criteria include: “All stations, [track # 7010 is a comm-
air.]” -- he is telling all team members this evaluation of the track. 
– Because addressed to all TMs & reported a higher level/ more final assess’t
of the track, i.e., a comm-air, was coded as a 10.  As more TMs discuss 
contact (i.e., more reports and/or updates have been shared among TMs), 
cognitive process coding category reflects a higher level of team 
understanding of the situation
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New Coding Categories
• Issuing an order regarding a course of action -- person with higher rank 
• Tells them to take some specific action against a potential threat track. 
- Issuing verbal warnings, illuminating or locking-on with radar, 
developing a firing solution, covering with missiles, etc. 
- Includes responding/ reporting have taken the action/acknowledging 
• Request a team member take some action -- tell team member to do something 
• Not a direct action against a threat track. 
- “Can you try and change 7006 and 7005 to assumed hostile.”
• Prodding a team member to jog their awareness
• To make sure they are following the discussion 
• Push or suggest to one or more team members to go out and 
generate knowledge, e.g., “You should go back and see if there is …”.  
• Might act in a role as teacher gently pushing collaborative effort certain way 
• “Contrarians” when a person says “Let’s re-evaluate/ reconsider
- Person disagrees with the current thinking of the team 
- “Outlier” who makes the team consider another viewpoint, or 
- “Pulls back the reins”
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Excerpt from MIO Scenario Communications Coding:
Developing Solution Alternatives




Cesium 137 can be used to make an RDD.  
If there are no explosives, then it is not 




Develop, rationalize and visualize 
solution alternatives; using data to 
justify a solution
Individual task knowledge development;
2 BO Roger will confiscate. itk Individual task knowledge development; 
individual TM clarifying data.
3 BO Make sure you handle carefully.  Cs-
137 is an external gamma hazard.
kio Knowledge interoperability:  TMs 
exchanging knowledge among each other.
4 BO Roger. Will take precautions. kio Knowledge interoperability:  TMs 
exchanging knowledge among each other.
5 SOC
OM
Does CG ship have proper storage 
area for material confiscated?
itk Individual task knowledge development: 




Search team will report size of 
material and its current containment 
condition; then make 
recommendations.
cu Team integration of individual TM 
knowledge for common understanding;
one or more TMs combine individual
pieces of knowledge to achieve 
common understanding.
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MIO Scenario Communications Coding:  Knowledge 
Interoperability Development and Agreement on a Final Plan
MIO Team Communications Cognitive Process Coding
Speaker Code
BO Negative for explosives Station
2.
kio Knowledge interoperability:  TMs ex-
changing knowledge among each other.
LLNL Finally received RAD data 
from station 2.  
kio Knowledge interoperability:  TMs 




Will need to resolve RAD 
containment hazard if it exists.
cu Team integration of individual TM 
knowledge for common understanding; 
one or more TMs combine individual
pieces of knowledge to achieve 
common understanding.
DTRA If you have plutonium, you 
need to confiscate.  It’s an 
alpha hazard, but still must be 
handled carefully
ica Iterative information collection and 
analysis; collecting and analyzing 
information to come up with a solution 
but no specific solution exists.
BO Roger. Misc Acknowledge report.
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MIO Scenario Communications Coding:  
Knowledge Interoperability Development and Agreement on 
a Final Plan (cont’d)
DTRA By the way, if plutonium is 
in solid metal form, your 
team can handle safely with 
rubber gloves and a dental 
face mask, depending on 
how much is there.
tsu Team shared understanding
development – discussion among all
team members on a particular topic or 
data item.
BO Talking to search team to 
see if this is within their 
capabilities or if we will 
need outside assets.
ica Iterative information collection and 
analysis; collecting and analyzing 
information to come up with a solution 
but no specific solution exists.
LLNL Hazard is probably 
minimal, can isolate and 
confiscate.
cs Team agreement on a common solution































1. Data to information (dti) 1 4 - 37 2 5 - 2
2. Individual mental model (imm) 8 11 18 25 1 7 8 14
3. Individual task knowledge development (itk) 25 30 31 29 35 7 47 325
4. Team knowledge development (tk) 11 5 18 1 3 5 8 210
5. Knowledge object development (ko) - - - - - 2 8 0
6. Visualization and representation (vrm) - - - - - - - 0
Collaborative Team Problem Solving
7. Common understanding (cu) - 6 - 2 6 7 16
8. Knowledge interoperability (kio) - 5 - 1 2 - 10 8
9. Iterative collection and analysis (ica) 1 11 - - 6 4 14 0
10
. Team shared understanding (tsu) 1 17 28 34 3 2 3 6
11
. Solution alternatives (sa) - 3 - - 6 - - 13
12
. Convergence of mental models (cmm) 1 - - - 1 - - 22
13
. Agreement on Common solution (cs) - 2 - - - - 1    19
Team Consensus Air Warfare Scenarios MIO Scenarios Firefig
hting
14 Team negotiation (tn) - - - - 4 - - 1
15 Team pattern recognition (tpr) - - - - - - - 3
16 Critical thinking (ct) - - - - - - - 3
17 Sharing hidden knowledge (shk) - 2 - - - - - 5
18 Solution adjustment against goal (sag) - - - - - - 0
Outcome Evaluation and Revision
19 Compare solution options against goals 
(csg)
- 1 - - - - - 2
20 Analyze, revise solutions (aro) - - - - - - - 1
21 Miscellaneous (misc) 38 27 57 61 6 - - 849
22 Issue order regarding course of action 
(coa)
7 5 17 37 - - 2 92
23 Request take action (rta) 3 2 18 8 1 2 11 53




Model of Team Collaboration: 
Validation
• Codes used by Firefighters 
– 19 out of the 23 cognitive processes in the model (all 
codes except:)
• knowledge object development (ko)- requires pictures and 
icons
• individual visualization and representation of meaning (vrm)-
requires visual aids
• iterative information collection and analysis (ica)- collect and 
analyze information without mentioning a solution
• solution adjustment against goal and exit criteria (sag)-
compares solution option against goal and exit criteria
– Did not pertain to FDNY radio communication but still 
pertain to other team collaboration environments and 
should not be eliminated from the collaboration model
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Model of Team Collaboration:  
Validation
Divide 2 hours, 21 minutes of recordings Æ problems faced
– Larger problem of Search and Evacuation – never got    
to final stages because the buildings collapsed
– Broken up into phases to represent the mental model 
within which the FDNY was working
– Divide into smaller problems
1. What happened? Create a mental model    
Time period: 0846-0902
1. Evacuate South Tower after the North had been hit? 
Time period: 0902-0958
1. How to divide units between the two towers?
Time period: 0958-1028




Model of Team Collaboration: Validation
• Trends in the codes, 1620 total speech turns
– 849   (52.41%) miscellaneous, removed for the following percentages,
leaving 771 total codes
– 325   (42.15%) itk – iterative team knowledge development
• asking lots of questions, how to alleviate questions and therefore 
message traffic?
– 210   (27.24%) tk – Developing team knowledge
• Sharing knowledge with fellow firefighters and passing knowledge
back to the dispatcher
– 92   (11.93%) coa – Course of action
• Telling the dispatcher and/or other responding units what to do
– 53   (6.87%) rta – Request take action
• Requesting something of the dispatcher or responding units
– 22   (2.85%) cmm — Constructing team mental model
– 16   2.08%) cu – Developing common understanding
– 14   (1.82%) imm – individual mental model
• Individuals contributing to the team’s mental model
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Model of Team Collaboration:  Validation
• Inter-rater Reliability Analysis
– Two coders, test subjectivity of model’s codes
– 34 out of 1626 codes (4.37%) were disagreements
• Discussed differing opinions to reach an 
agreement with the other coder
– 49 out of 1626 codes (6.31%) were decided upon after 
a discussion between the coders
• One or both of the coders was unsure of how to 
code the communication turn and left it to discuss 
further with the other coder.
• In total, did not completely agree on 10.68% of codes
• Reliable 89.32% of the codes
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Adherence to SOP
• Minor Deviations, SOP Deviation #1
– ID speaker and addressee
– Requesting ambulances and units
– Casual communication
– 10 codes
• Major Deviations, SOP Deviation #2
– Unit to Unit transmissions
– Use first names
• Major Deviations, SOP Deviation #3
– Urgent Radio Messages (24 messages identified 
as urgent)
– Mayday Radio Messages (3 messages identified 
as mayday)
• Department-wide Recall
– Never used before




• Differences between three scenarios - how the team’s behavior maps to the model
– Course of action selection is done less collaboratively in tactical domains,       
due to inherent time pressure to make decisions and take actions
• Decisions made unilaterally by tactical action officer or commanding officer --
do not typically involve discussion with the rest of the team. 
• Decisions regarding course of action selection entailed very little collaboration for         
air warfare tasks due to the speed of the potential threat aircraft. 
– When actions need to be taken very quickly in an attempt to determine the intent 
of an inbound track, time is not available to discuss alternative courses of action
• Air warfare consists of situation assessment (“what’s going on”) and action selection 
(“what to do about it”) 
– Decisionmakers use a recognition-primed decisionmaking strategy (Klein, 1989)
• Situation itself either determines or constrains the response options
• Recognition primed model of decisionmaking fuses two processes —
situation assessment and mental simulation (Klein, 1993) 
– Simplest case the situation is recognized as familiar or prototypical, 
using feature matching, and the obvious response is implemented 
– More complex case -- decisionmaker performs conscious evaluation of  
response, using mental simulation to uncover problems prior to 
implementing
– In most complex case -- evaluation reveals flaws requiring modification, 
or option is judged inadequate/rejected in favor of next typical reaction 
• Experienced DMs make 90% of all decisions w/o considering alternatives
• If situation appears similar to one previously experienced, pattern will be 
recognized and COA is usually immediately obvious
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Adherence to SOP- Mayday
FDNY CommunicationsType of Mayday Message 
Speaker             
Imminent collapse feared N/A
Structural collapse has occurred FIELD Engine 3-9 acting, report on the 22nd floor, 
reporting a floor collapse at that location, K.
A firefighter is unconscious or 
suffers a life threatening injury
FIELD We have a medical emergency, possible 
heart attack, firemen, we're on the bulkhead, 
west, requesting oxygen for the firemen, K.
A firefighter becomes aware 
that another firefighter is missing
N/A
A firefighter becomes trapped or lost - A civilian came on the radio asking for help 
because they were trapped in the rubble after 
the South Tower collapsed. While the 
civilian did not know about the correct use of 
“mayday” the dispatcher relayed the message 
saying, “transmitting a mayday.”
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Adherence to SOP- Urgent
FDNY CommunicationsType of Urgent 
Message Speaker             
DISPATCH Manhattan to Field Comm., urgent.
FIELD Receive, Manhattan, Field Comm.
DISPATCH Tower No. 2, 19th floor, firefighter down.  Tower No. 2, 19th floor, firefighter down.
FIELD Field Comm. Received.
FIELD Engine 3-9 acting, report on the 22nd floor, reporting a floor collapse at that location, K.
FIELD Marine 1 to Manhattan with an urgent message, K.
DISPATCH Unit with an urgent message, K.
Fire is entering an 
exposure to a degree 
that any delay may 
considerably enlarge 
the fire problem
FIELD This is Marine 1, we’re in the river.  You’ve got fire out of the north side and now 
coming out of the west side of the World Trade Center, the west side.
FIELD Engine 317 to Manhattan, urgent.
DISPATCH Engine 3-1-7, go.
FIELD I’ve got… from the Port Authority telling me that the elevators are on the 44th floor.  
Don’t use them, they’re about to come down.
DISPATCH Engine 33 urgent, go.
FIELD Engine 22 is being manned by an off-duty member form Rescue 1.  Be advised it appears 
that we have lost water pressure down in lower Manhattan. Can you have Marine 1 or 
any other available fire boat respond to Vescey Street on the West Side? We're going to 
need water supply into the area, K.
Loss of water which 
would endanger 
firefighters
Report of apparatus 
breakdown while 
unit is responding to 
an alarm
Discovery of a 
structural problem 
indicating the danger 
of collapse
A firefighter suffers 
an injury that is not 







– Vague, inaccurate information
• Reporting floor numbers
• Referring to the two towers
• Major Losses
– After the South Tower collapsed
• Who survived?  Field Comm?
– After the North Tower collapsed
• Where were the responding units?  Who was in 
which tower?





0904 Marine 6 Marine 6, that plane was a large bomber-style green 
aircraft into the second tower, be advised.
Car 9 Car 9 to Manhattan.
DISPATCH Car 9 go ahead.
Car 9 Would you advise the mobile command vehicle to come in 
on West and Liberty Street, West and Liberty Street. 
DISPATCH I already advised them.
Car 9 What’s their ETA?
DIS-
PATCH
Manhattan calling Field Comm.
Car 9 came 
back on the 
radio to correct
Dispatch, saying









I've got ... from the Port Authority telling me that the 
elevators are on the 44th floor. Don't use them, 
they're about to come down.
DIS-
PATCH
Is that going to be for No. 2 or No. 1
World Trade?
Wasn't sure. I'd say go with both.
DIS-
PATCH
Attention all companies operating at the fifth alarm for both 
World Trade Centers, the elevators, the Port Authority 
reports the elevators on the No. 4-4 floor are about to come
down. All companies operating at No. 1 and No. 2 World
Trade Center at the fifth alarm, do not use the elevators. 
They are about to come down as per  the Port Authority on
the No. 4-4 floor. Field Comm., receive that urgent? 
Manhattan to Ladder 2-1, K.
0930 None.                                The firefighters work-
ing in whichever build-
ing the elevators were 
not coming down in 
would have had con-
tinued access to 
elevators, but instead 
were told not to use 
them because of vague 
information. 
None. None.
FIX EFFECTS 
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